

TOP SECRET

25 September 1958

Copy No. C 59

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 12
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X
1.1 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TG 2 C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HE 70-2
DATE: 1-4-80 REVIEWER:

State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000120001-3

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000120001-3

25X1

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

25 September 1958

DAILY BRIEF

25X1

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Watch Committee conclusion--Taiwan Strait: All indications point to continued Chinese Communist efforts to interdict supply lines to the Kinmen (Quemoy) Island group.

25X1

The Chinese Communists now possess a capability to launch major attacks against the Kinmens, the Matsus, and smaller offshore islands with little or no warning, as well as to launch major air strikes against Taiwan and the Penghus (Pescadores). Seizure of one or more of the offshore islands is possible, but amphibious lift necessary for an invasion of Kinmen, Lieh Hsu (Little Quemoy) and Matsu has not yet been observed.

25X1

25X1

Available evidence fails to reveal that the USSR has taken any measures which might reflect preparation to implement the Soviet commitments to the defense of Communist China.

25X1

25X1

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

03
No
Britain-Jordan: London and Amman have tentatively agreed that British evacuation of Jordan will begin on 20 October and be completed by 31 October. Subject to a continuing examination of Nasir's actions, the two governments plan a simultaneous announcement of these plans by 10 October.

25X1

25 Sept 58

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

25X1

40
Cyprus-Turkey: The threat of an early resumption of widespread violence on Cyprus may have been eased by Turkey's agreement to invest its consul general in Nicosia with the functions of Turkish representative under the new British plan, instead of naming a special ambassador as originally proposed. Ankara warns of "serious trouble," however, if Archbishop Makarios is allowed to return to the island, something London is now considering. Meanwhile, Makarios' new proposal for UN-guaranteed independence for Cyprus is meeting opposition from within the Cyprus eth-narchy from leftist elements in Greece, and from Turkish Cypriot leaders.

25X1

No
Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: Although a deliberate initiation of open hostilities in the Middle East is unlikely in the immediate future, the situation remains unstable throughout the area, particularly where US and UK interests or commitments are involved, and incidents and coups could occur at any time.

No
In Lebanon, Moslem-Christian strife has broken out which may threaten the stability of the country, and incidents could occur involving US forces.

The survival of the Jordanian regime continues to be threatened. If the regime in Jordan collapses, action by

25 Sept 58

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

Israel and other neighboring countries to take control of Jordanian territory is likely.

Within the Iraqi regime, growing instability, dissension, and fragmentation offer increasing opportunities for local Communist exploitation and action by Nasir to bring about an outcome favorable to the UAR.

The formation of the provisional Algerian government probably will cause an increase in fighting between French forces and rebels in Algeria and could lead to an increase in incidents between French forces and those of Morocco and Tunisia.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000120001-3

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000120001-3

British Plans for Evacuation From Jordan

Britain hopes to announce before 30 September that it intends to evacuate its 3,200 troops from Jordan. According to British Ambassador Johnston in Amman, the British foreign secretary and the chief Jordanian UN delegate have agreed that the evacuation will take place between 20 and 31 October and that this schedule will be announced simultaneously by London and Amman about 10 October.

According to Johnston, the schedule is subject to tangible evidence of UAR President Nasir's good faith in carrying out the 21 August UN General Assembly resolution endorsing the Arab League's pledge of mutual noninterference in internal affairs. In view of both British and Jordanian awareness that Nasir has in fact continued his campaign against the Jordanian Government, if on a less violent scale, this condition appears intended only to allow deferment of the evacuation in the event that Nasir steps up his activities. British official thinking tends toward the desirability of reaching an accommodation with Nasir. In view of the practical difficulties of maintaining British forces in Jordan, especially after American evacuation from Lebanon, the Macmillan government is anxious to remove them, barring a new emergency.

London remains pessimistic about the future prospects for Jordan's independence and seems to favor replacing Samir Rifai as Jordanian premier with someone less offensive to Nasir as a means of holding the state together. Ambassador Johnston has also indicated that King Husayn is considering a trip to Europe for a medical check-up, possibly by the end of October.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000120001-3

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000120001-3

25X1

III. THE WEST

Austria Reported Yielding to Pressure on Relations With Communist China

25X1

[REDACTED] Austria will "soon" establish an embassy in Communist China. Vienna has heretofore hesitated to break with the US on this issue, but, in response to pressure from commercial interests, the quasi-official chamber of commerce recently decided to establish a permanent trade mission in Communist China. Soviet representatives in Vienna have frequently urged the Austrians to recognize Peiping.

Soviet pressure was also involved in Austria's decision to abstain in the 23 September vote in the UN on the Chinese moratorium proposal. Moscow has complained to the Austrians that Austria had consistently voted with the US against Soviet interests and had never separated itself from the US on matters of importance to the USSR.

Vienna has shown an increasing tendency to soft-pedal its pro-Western orientation. This has been evident, for example, in the decision to permit the Communist-front World Youth Festival to meet in Vienna next year, in the decision to join the bloc-dominated Eastern Danube Convention, in the increase in official visits, and in Chancellor Raab's praise of the USSR during his July visit to Moscow. While these gestures are linked with Austrian hopes for economic advantages--particularly a reduction in reparations--they also reflect Raab's obsession with the idea of "breaking down the iron curtain." American Embassy representatives in Vienna have recently deplored as well a tendency among other Austrian officials to equate Austria's international status with that of Finland.

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000120001-3

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
 Scientific Adviser to the President
 Director of the Budget
 Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
 Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
 Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
 Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
 Special Adviser to the President

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
 The Counselor
 Director, International Cooperation Administration
 The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of the Army
 The Secretary of the Navy
 The Secretary of the Air Force
 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps
 The Director, The Joint Staff
 Chief of Staff, United States Army
 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
 Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
 Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
 Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
 Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000120001-3

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000120001-3

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000120001-3

TOP SECRET